The Soul’s Logical Life and Jungian Schisms

Abstract

In the decades after Jung’s death, only a handful of Jungian analysts have attempted to revise Jung’s psychology by identifying its essence and reevaluating it in light of that essence. One such analyst is Wolfgang Giegerich. Over two decades ago he published his acclaimed book, The Soul’s Logical Life, in which, building on the work of James Hillman, he argues that Jung’s foremost insight was into the reality of the soul, or the objective psyche. Giegerich maintains that Jung’s commitment to soul set him apart from his contemporaries and constitutes the distinctive essence of Jungian psychology. Stated in alchemical terms, soul is the philosophical gold of Jungian psychology. This article provides an overview of Giegerich’s notion of soul and clarifies what he means by the soul’s “logical life.” It also examines how Jung failed to consistently conceive of soul in terms fitting for the modern discipline of psychology. Jung knew that psychology was incompatible with metaphysics, theology, and mysticism, and routinely denied that his psychology improperly incorporated the latter. But Giegerich shows that Jung, despite his disclaimers, too often used a conception of soul in which archetypes and the Self are conceived as transcendental and eternal realities. The author shows how this unresolved contradiction in Jung’s conception of soul has led to schisms within Jungian training institutes and how these schisms are an example of the soul’s logical life.