Abstract
ABSTRACTThe Socratic fallacy is the supposed mistake of inferring that somebody does not know any instances or attributes of a universal because of their inability to give a satisfactory definition. I argue that Socrates does not make this inference. Instead he interprets definitional failure as indicating that the interlocutor has not stated his knowledge. Moreover, I argue that Socrates’ commitment to the necessity of definitions of universals for knowledge of particulars reduces to the claim that a person who knows something about virtue has the ability to speak the whole of it. This is, I suggest, not so much a ‘style of mistaken thinking’ as a profound affirmation of the possibility of philosophy.
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