Abstract
We know that conceptual models, or frames, are more than simply angles of vision or approaches. Each is comprised of theories, assumptions, and categories that influence where we look and what we find. Frames shape how questions are asked, what is taken as evidence, the conclusions drawn, and subsequent actions. In this paper, I consider the frame, identification of root causes, and policy recommendations of the 9/11 Commission report by comparing it with two others: The report of the presidential commission that investigated the space shuttle Challenger accident (1986) and the investigation board's report on the Columbia accident (2003). In making the comparison, I am not equating the three incidents. Terrorist attacks taking the lives of nearly 3000 and resulting in war are vastly different in immediate impact and long-range consequences from the two space shuttle accidents. There is a logic to the comparison, however. Having analyzed the social causes of the Challenger accident (Vaughan, 1996) and subsequently worked on the staff of the Columbia
Published Version
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