The Social Psychology of Arms Control and Reciprocation

Abstract

Unilateral initiatives are discussed in terms of a social-psychological perspective. This perspective concentrates on interaction processes with particular attention paid to conditions for reciprocity between an initiator who manages impressions and a receiver who processes information. Historical perspectives on reciprocity have emphasized the normative aspects as expectations among group members who have positive sentiments toward one another. Implications for relations among adversaries are developed from more recent literatures on gaming, social, and cognitive psychology. These literatures contribute such ideas as initiatives-as-starting-mechanisms, the distinction between agreements and relationships, complex informationprocessing mechanisms (including the adjustment of expectations), and attribution biases in interpreting another nation's intentions. Further understanding of the attribution process is gained from work on expression games where other channels of strategic communication are highlighted. The article concludes with a discussion of the relevance of social-psychological processes for relations among nations and argues that the problem consists of defining linkages between micro- and macrolevel processes as reflected, for example, in recurring patterns of effects of behaviors and structures.