Abstract
This paper proposes a social account for the origin of the truth value and the emergence of the first declarative sentence. Such a proposal is based on two assumptions. The first is known as the social intelligence hypothesis: that the cognitive evolution of humans is first and foremost an adaptation to social demands. The second is the function-first approach to explaining the evolution of traits: before a prototype of a new trait develops and the adaptation process begins, something already existing is used for a new purpose. Applied to the emergence of declarative sentences, this suggests something already existing—natural signs (which have a logical or causal relation to what they denote)—were used for the declarative function and thereby integrated (in the form of indexical objects implying a past action) into communication. I show that the display of an indexical object (such as the display of hunting trophies) can imply a conceptual structure similar to that informing the syntax of sentences. The view developed in this paper is broadly consistent with the argumentative theory of Mercier and Sperber, which suggests that reasoning is less adapted to decision making than to social purposes such as winning disputes or justifying one’s actions. In this paper I extend this view to the origin of the concept of truth. According to my proposal, the first declarative sentence (articulated in a simple sign language) emerged as a negation of a negation of an implicit statement expressed by the display of an indexical object referring to a past action. Thereby, I suggest that the binary structure of the truth value underlying any declarative sentence is founded on disagreements based on conflicts of interest. Thus, I deny that the concept of truth could have evolved for instrumental reasons such as solving problems, or through self-questioning about what one ought to believe.
Highlights
The Concept of Truth and the Ape TestEssential aspects of human evolution—such as the development of language (Hauser et al, 2014), episodic memory (Suddendorf, 2013a) and mind reading (Baron-Cohen, 1999)—are still not fully understood
The higher order structure is founded in physical incorporating elements and social situations
In this essay I have argued that truth values are of social origin
Summary
Essential aspects of human evolution—such as the development of language (Hauser et al, 2014), episodic memory (Suddendorf, 2013a) and mind reading (theory of mind) (Baron-Cohen, 1999)—are still not fully understood. I will reevaluate the relevance of declarations in the context of language evolution (that language evolved for fulfilling a declarative function); I shall answer the first question (α) by identifying p, which will suggest the identity of x (the older structure used for a new purpose) and specify the original evolutionary function (OEF). At the ETP an individual acquires a reproductive advantage with regard to a new function for the first time that eventually will develop into a trait This is, as we shall see, important in relation to the problem of the emergence of language, because early language use is always embedded in a social context in which there is at least a sender and a recipient present. Again, the concrete scenarios outlined above shall be understood as examples for illustrating a broader idea: The dispute over truth creates the binary structure underlying any declaration, which is the potential for dispute inherent in the concept of truth
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