The social mind: disentangling affective and cognitive routes to understanding others

Philipp Kanske

doi:10.1080/03080188.2018.1453243

Abstract

ABSTRACTTo flexibly adjust behaviour to that of other people around us requires some representation of their overt actions, but also of the driving forces behind them, that is, their goals, intentions, and emotions. Socio-affective and -cognitive functions enable such representations via creating vicarious affective states in the observer (empathy) or by accumulating abstract, propositional knowledge of another person’s mental state (Theory of Mind). While the empathic sharing of another’s emotions is implemented by those neural networks that also process first-hand emotion, Theory of Mind activates a widespread network that seems to process information independent of its specific modality or content. Crucially, these two routes can function independently as individual differences in the respective capacities and network activations are unrelated and selective impairments in one or the other function occur in psychopathology. However, they may co-activate and co-operate in complex social situations, determining how prosocially interactive behaviour unfolds.

Highlights

Humans encounter and interact with others, their conspecifics, on a continual basis in a multitude of social relations
Social psychological and neuroscience research over the last few years has identified at least two routes to such representation: an affective route that allows us to feel with others and a cognitive route that enables understanding of others’ mental states
The present review describes these two routes, including their location within the larger domain of social psychological processes, outlines the neural mechanisms underlying them, and characterizes their interplay during

Summary

Introduction

Humans encounter and interact with others, their conspecifics, on a continual basis in a multitude of social relations. Social psychological and neuroscience research over the last few years has identified at least two routes to such representation: an affective route that allows us to feel with others (that is, empathy; de Vignemont and Singer 2006) and a cognitive route that enables understanding of others’ mental states (that is, Theory of Mind [ToM] or mentalizing; Frith and Frith 2005). Crucial evidence regarding these questions comes from alterations of socio-affective and -cognitive functioning in psychopathology and from the relations to actual (pro-)social behaviour.

Results

Conclusion