Abstract

Summary Assume that the private goods and the public good are weakly separable, the private goods are gross complements, and the private utility function is a homogeneous of degree one function with constant elasticity of substitution. We demonstrate that, under commodity taxation, the social marginal cost curve of public good provision is initially upward sloping and eventually becomes downward sloping. Moreover, the social marginal cost eventually falls below the private marginal cost. These unusual properties arise from a demand-shift effect: An increase in the tax rate raises the marginal willingness to pay for the public good since it pushes up the unit cost of private utility, hence making the public good more attractive than private goods. In other words, the supply of the public good creates its own demand when the funding to cover production costs is raised through distortionary commodity taxes. It follows that there may exist three solutions to the first-order condition for the second-best problem: two of them are interior solutions and one is a corner solution.

Highlights

  • Pigou (1947, p. 34) claims that when the funding to cover production costs is raised through distortionary taxes, the social marginal cost of the public good is higher than its private marginal cost (Rule Property), and the second-best level of public good provision is lower than the first-best level (Level Property)

  • We assume that the first-best regime is well-behaved, i.e., the demand curve for the public good is downward sloping, and it meets the private-marginal-cost (PMC) curve at a unique interior point

  • We restrict our attention to the model of Wilson (1991a), namely, our Example 3.2, where there are one untaxed private good, one taxed private good, and one public good, the Marshallian demand for each private commodity is independent of the public good provision level, and the private utility function is a homogeneous of degree one CES function

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Summary

SUMMARY

Assume that the private goods and the public good are weakly separable, the private goods are gross complements, and the private utility function is a homogeneous of degree one function with constant elasticity of substitution. The social marginal cost eventually falls below the private marginal cost These unusual properties arise from a demand-shift effect: An increase in the tax rate raises the marginal willingness to pay for the public good since it pushes up the unit cost of private utility, making the public good more attractive than private goods. The supply of the public good creates its own demand when the funding to cover production costs is raised through distortionary commodity taxes. It follows that there may exist three solutions to the first-order condition for the second-best problem: two of them are interior solutions and one is a corner solution

Introduction
The Model
The Four Effects The first-best g satisfies the following equation:
The Four Effects Compared
The SMC Curve
The MDL as a Function of Public Good Provision and Post-Tax Price
The MDL as a Function of Public Good Provision
The Three Fundamental Issues
Conclusions
Full Text
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