Abstract

We discuss the social-epistemic aspects of Catherine Elgin’s theory of reflective equilibrium and understanding and argue that it yields an argument for the view that a crucial social-epistemic function of epistemic authorities is to foster understanding in their communities. We explore the competences that enable epistemic authorities to fulfil this role and argue that among them is an epistemic virtue we call “epistemic empathy”.

Highlights

  • One of the most vibrant developments in current epistemology is the exploration of epistemic ends and values other than knowledge, most notably understanding

  • We discuss Elgin’s equilibrium analysis of understanding and argue that, among other merits, it has the potential to provide a seminal perspective on the social-epistemic function of epistemic authority: appropriately reconstructed, the

  • Recent discussions of epistemic authority have largely focused on laypersons or novices,8 asking how they should rationally react to the views of epistemic authorities

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Summary

Introduction

One of the most vibrant developments in current epistemology is the exploration of epistemic ends and values other than knowledge, most notably understanding. The fact that we often (rationally) turn to epistemic authorities in order to create or reinstate reflective equilibrium in our noetic networks has the following interesting consequence. Even if one accepts reductionism, our argument shows that epistemic authority is good for far more than transmitting individual beliefs: it can promote the richer and more ambitious epistemic goal of improving complex noetic networks in terms of understanding. From a holistic point of view, a noetic network approaches equilibrium when epistemically relevant relations such as support relations in some (ideally non-isolated) subsystem, or connections between different subsystems, are multiplied or strengthened. This is typically not an all-or-nothing affair, but a matter of approximation. Recent discussions of epistemic authority have largely focused on laypersons or novices, asking how they should rationally react to the views of epistemic authorities. But what about authorities themselves? Which skills and virtues will they possess and exercise when they promote understanding in their epistemic communities? We argue that an important intellectual virtue in this context is what we call epistemic empathy

Approaching reflective equilibrium
Experts and authorities
Epistemic empathy
Conclusion: authorities as sources of understanding
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