The social dilemma of bribery in emerging economies: A dynamic model of emotion, social value, and institutional uncertainty

Abstract

Corruption dampens social justice and can hurt consumer welfare through increases in transaction costs and perceived unfairness in resource distribution. This study examines the particular corruption practice of bribery. It conceptualizes bribery decisions in terms of social dilemmas, that is, the acquisition of valuable assets for personal good vs. maintaining a fair and open mechanism for the collective common good. To better understand this social dilemma, institutional uncertainty was incorporated to contextualize the decision situation. Combining both cognitive and emotional mechanisms, the proposed model deliberates the psychological process of the social dilemma, particularly the contradiction between social values and selfinterests as well as their influences on ethical emotions such as shame and fear. A double loop model is further proposed to elucidate the societal dynamics of bribery decisions, which suggests a solution to reduce the likelihood of the social dilemma by governing the social consequences of bribery, enhancing social value, decreasing the uncertainty level of institutions, and intensifying emotional inhibition, where managing the levels of institutional uncertainty center the dynamics.