Abstract

Like other approaches in the social sciences, social constructionist studies have too often construed the self as some manner of mental image, or representation, we privately carry of our own identity. While socially shaped, this image is understood as an essentially personal possession about which its possessor can legitimately claim a categorically privileged form of knowledge. This residual commitment to theoretically privileging the first person perspective on the self inhibits our appreciation for the extent to which the validity of self-knowledge is a dynamic and ongoing collective accomplishment rather than a strictly private personal assessment. This essay briefly reviews a selection of canonical contributions to the social constructionist literature on the self, demonstrating specifically how they theoretically privilege the first person perspective. It then demonstrates how the work of Melvin Pollner provides conceptual resources for effectively overcoming this unfortunate tendency.

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