The Sixth Commissioner

Is the United States losing its position as the world's leading capital market? Recent statistics suggest that U.S. stock exchanges have been losing ground to foreign stock exchanges. The share of equity raised in global public markets represented by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), NASDAQ, and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) combined dropped from 28.8% in 2002 to 23.0% in 2009.1 1Comm. on Capital Markets Regulation, The Competitive Position of the U.S. Public Equity Market 7 (Dec. 4, 2007), available athttp://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/The_Competitive_Position_of_the_US_Public_Equity_Market.pdf; World Fed'n of Exch., 2009 Annual Report and Statistics 118, available athttp://www.world-exchanges.org/files/statistics/excel/WFE09%20final.pdf. Foreign delistings from the NYSE rose from 3.9% of all listed foreign companies in 1997 to 8.7% in 2009.2 2Comm. on Capital Markets Regulation, supra note 1, at 21; World Fed'n of Exch., supra note 1, at 104–05. The U.S. market capitalization decreased from 47.8% of the total global market capitalization in 1999 to 31.6% in 2009.3 3 Brown, Elizabeth F., The Tyranny of the Multitude Is a Multiplied Tyranny: Is the United States Financial Regulatory Structure Undermining U.S. Competitiveness?, 2 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 369, 393– 94 (2008); World Fed'n of Exch., supra note 1, at 102. Market capitalization is as measured by the World Federation of Exchanges. Although in 2000, nine of the top ten initial public offerings (IPOs) in the world took place on U.S. exchanges, by 2005, only one of the twenty-five largest IPOs took place on a U.S. exchange.4 4Eric Pan, Why the World No Longer Puts Its Stock in Us 2–3 (Dec. 13, 2006) (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal Stud. Working Paper No. 176), available athttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=951705. In the first half of 2010, Asian exchanges dominated equity IPOs, with $22.6 billion raised on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and US$8.9 billion raised on the Shanghai Stock Exchange as opposed to $6.7 billion on the NYSE.5 5World Fed'n of Exch., Market Highlights For First Half-Year 2010, 8, available athttp://www.world-exchanges.org/files/file/stats%20and%20charts/July%202010%20WFE%20Market%Highlights.pdf. Commentators argue that one reason for the declining importance of the U.S. stock markets is the high level of regulation in the United States, especially after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.6 6Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter SOX]. Proponents of regulatory competition argue that the U.S. securities regulatory regime is too onerous and that companies should, instead, be allowed to choose which jurisdiction's securities law should apply to them. See, e.g., Choi, Stephen, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 279 (2000); Choi, Stephen J. & Guzman, Andrew T., Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 903 (1998); Coffee, John C., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1757 (2002); Palmiter, Alan R., Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1; Romano, Roberta, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 2359 (1998). But there is also a concern that regulatory competition will lead to a race to the bottom. See Cox, James D., Choice of Law Rules for International Securities Transactions?, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1179, 1186 (1998) (arguing the parties should not be able to avoid U.S. securities regulation in private securities transactions partly because there is a "need to protect investors from themselves"). For more on the regulatory competition debate, see Jackson, Howell E. & Pan, Eric J., Regulatory Competition in International Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe in 1999—Part I, 56 Bus. Law. 653, 658 (2001). In response to comment letters from many foreign private issuers requesting exemptions from some of the requirements of SOX, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) did grant certain accommodations. In addition, in 2007, the SEC adopted a rule that allowed certain foreign private issuers to deregister and no longer be subject to U.S. securities regulation (the "deregistration rule"). With the recent global financial crisis, however, there have been renewed calls for more stringent U.S. regulation to prevent future financial crises.7 7 See, e.g., Coffee, John C. & Sale, Hillary A., Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 Va. L. Rev. 707 (2009); Cunningham, Lawrence A. & Zaring, David, The Three or Four Approaches to Financial Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 39 (2009). The current crisis has rattled world markets, resulting in, among other events, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and some foreign governments needing International Monetary Fund packages.8 8 See, e.g., Davidoff, Steven M. & Zaring, David, Regulation by Deal: The Government's Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 Admin. L. Rev. 463 (2009); Okamoto, Karl S., After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 183 (2009). In a November 17, 2009 speech, SEC Commissioner Kathleen Casey stated that one of the lessons of the current financial crisis is that financial stability depends on investor confidence, which in turn depends on the transparency of financial statements.9 9Kathleen L. Casey, Comm'r, SEC, Lessons from the Financial Crisis for Financial Reporting, Standard Setting and Rule Making (Nov. 17, 2009), available athttp://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch111709klc.htm. As Congress had directed the SEC to review and study fair value accounting standards, the SEC delivered a report that included several recommendations on changes to fair value accounting standards to Congress which may result in new securities regulations.10 10 Id. In an increasingly global market, it is important for the United States to understand—before undertaking further reforms—the effects of increased securities regulation on the competitiveness of its stock markets. While U.S. securities laws should be reformed to decrease the risk of, and mitigate the effects of, future financial crises, absent a global harmonized regulatory regime, the United States should be careful to minimize the costs imposed by U.S. securities regulation on foreign private issuers.11 11"Foreign private issuer" is defined in Rule 405 promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933 and Rule 3b-4 promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.405, 240.3b-4 (2010). The United States benefits from foreign private issuers listing on domestic exchanges. And, U.S. investors find it easier to invest in shares of foreign companies if they are listed in the United States. In addition, foreign private issuers listed in the United States are subject to U.S. securities law, which provides better investor protection than many comparable foreign laws.12 12 See infra Part I.A. The experience of foreign private issuers accessing the U.S. market in the 2000s, especially after SOX and the deregistration rule, provides useful guidance regarding the effect of strengthened U.S. securities law on the attractiveness of U.S. markets for foreign private issuers. In this article, I examine the impact of post-SOX strengthening of U.S. securities law on the conduct of foreign private issuers. Part I provides some general background about foreign private issuers listing in the United States. It starts by discussing the benefits to the United States of having foreign private issuers list on U.S. exchanges. Part I also explores the costs and benefits of listing in the United States for foreign private issuers, especially in light of potential flowback13 13"Flowback" refers to American investors choosing to convert their American Depository Receipts (ADRs) into ordinary shares that are traded on non-U.S. stock markets. problems and the increasing availability of foreign exchanges as alternatives to the U.S. exchanges. Next, in Part II, I discuss the legal regime facing foreign private issuers, looking at the SEC's pre-SOX attempts to make the U.S. markets more attractive to them, at the controversy over the application of SOX to foreign private issuers, and at the SEC's post-SOX accommodations for foreign private issuers. Part II also reviews prior studies on SOX's effects on foreign private issuers. Part III then describes my three studies of foreign private issuers' behavior after SOX. The first study looks to see if, in a given region, the median relative U.S. trading volume14 14"Relative U.S. trading volume" refers to the trading volume the issuer obtains in the United States over the trading volume the issuer obtains in its home market. "Trading volume" is the number of shares of a security traded in a given market during a given day. For details on the calculation for relative U.S. trading volume, see infra Part III.A.1. of issuers that delist tends to be lower than the median relative U.S. trading volume of issuers that do not and to see which region's issuers are likely to find the United States to be a less important market. For each of the six regions15 15The six regions are East Asia, Europe, Latin America, Japan, Israel, and Australia. See infra Part III.A.1. I studied, issuers who remain listed on the U.S. exchanges as of January 31, 2010 tend to have lower relative U.S. trading volumes than those who voluntarily delisted16 16Issuers who voluntarily delisted are those who exited the U.S. market other than (i) those who were delisted by a U.S. exchange or (ii) those who were merged into another company. before January 31, 2010. Issuers from developed countries tend to have lower relative U.S. trading volumes. My second study finds that more issuers from regions with lower relative U.S. trading volume voluntarily delisted from the United States after the passage of SOX. My third study reviews SEC filings, cataloging the reasons foreign private issuers give for delisting. Many of the delisting issuers stated in press releases filed with the SEC that their low trading volumes in the United States did not justify the costs of being listed in the United States, especially after the additional regulatory burden imposed by SOX. Finally, I conclude by looking at the implications of the finding that issuers from developed regions with low relative U.S. trading volumes are more likely to delist as a result of increased securities regulation imposed by SOX. Because issuers from more developed countries are better investment prospects for U.S. investors, the SEC should consider granting these foreign issuers exemptions from any new U.S. securities regulations, to encourage them to continue listing in the United States. This part provides some general background, discussing the reasons the United States wants to encourage foreign private issuers to list on its exchanges. To maintain these benefits, the United States must ensure that a U.S. listing provides foreign private issuers with more benefits than costs, especially as foreign private issuers may face flowback problems, and foreign securities exchanges are increasingly becoming viable alternatives to U.S. exchanges. This part discusses the benefits and costs for foreign private issuers listing in the United States. Understanding both the benefits to the United States of having foreign issuers list on U.S. exchanges and what foreign private issuers perceive to be the benefits and costs of listing in the United States then assists in a determination of which foreign private issuers should be encouraged to list in the United States and how the U.S. securities regulations might be used to encourage these issuers to list. U.S. retail investors and the overall U.S. capital markets benefit from foreign private issuers listing in the United States. Investing in foreign companies provides investors with diversification, allowing them to select the optimal trade-off between risk and return.17 17U.S. Chamber of Commerce Comm'n on the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21st Century, Report and Recommendations 39 (Mar. 2007), available athttp://library.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/0703capmarkets_full.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Chamber of Commerce Comm'n Report]; Jackson, Howell E., A System of Selective Substitute Compliance, 48 Harv. Int'l L.J. 105, 111 (2007); Tafara, Ethiopis & Peterson, Robert J., A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 Harv. Int'l L.J. 31, 41 (2007). Further, foreign companies are attractive to U.S. retail investors because many of the fastest-growing companies are foreign companies.18 18U.S. Chamber of Commerce Comm'n Report, supra note 17, at 39; Davidoff, Steven M., Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 89, 115– 16 (2007); Jackson, supra note 17, at 111; Tafara & Peterson, supra note 17, at 48. U.S. retail investors can invest abroad but they face certain barriers. First, there are risks associated with investing in a foreign market.19 19Jackson, supra note 17, at 112; Tafara & Peterson, supra note 17, at 41–42. U.S. retail investors investing abroad may be unaware that they are investing in securities not subject to SEC oversight.20 20Jackson, supra note 17, at 112; Tafara & Peterson, supra note 17, at 42. Foreign countries may not have an effective legal enforcement regime.21 21Tafara & Peterson, supra note 17, at 42. It is easier and less risky for U.S. retail investors to invest in foreign companies if they are listed in the United States.22 22U.S. Chamber of Commerce Comm'n Report, supra note 17, at 39; Tafara & Peterson, supra note 17, at 41. Listing in the United States subjects the foreign private issuer to U.S. securities law, which gives better investor protection than comparable law in many foreign jurisdictions.23 23Tafara & Peterson, supra note 17, at 42; Doidge, Craig G. et al., Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More?, 71 J. Fin. Econ. 205, 209 (2004). Second, there are transactional costs associated with investing abroad. To invest abroad, U.S. investors often either have to trade on a foreign exchange through a U.S.-registered broker, thereby having to go through two layers of intermediaries, or have to open an account with a foreign broker.24 24Jackson, supra note 17, at 111; Tafara & Peterson, supra note 17, at 47–48. U.S. retail investors may also lack adequate information about these foreign companies because foreign private issuers and foreign financial broker-dealers that do not comply with SEC registration and compliance requirements are not able to directly solicit U.S. retail investors.25 25U.S. Chamber of Commerce Comm'n Report, supra note 17, at 39; Jackson, supra note 17, at 111; Tafara & Peterson, supra note 17, at 48. Maintaining an environment friendly to foreign private issuers is important to the United States remaining the global financial center. Foreign private issuers constitute a significant portion of the IPOs and listings in the United States.26 26Brown, supra note 3, at 395. U.S. exchanges benefit from being able to obtain listing and trading fees, one of their major sources of revenue, from foreign private issuers that list on them.27 27Davidoff, supra note 18, at 127–28. For the schedule of fees paid to NYSE, see http://www.nyse.com/regulation/nyse/1147474807417.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2010). Regarding NASDAQ's fees, see NASDAQ, Listing Standards and Fees ( July 2010), available athttp://www.nasdaq.com/about/nasdaq_listing_req_fees.pdf. Keeping the U.S. markets attractive to foreign private issuers is important for maintaining the dominance of U.S. financial services sector, an important sector for the United States. One out of every nineteen Americans works in financial services and the industry represents eight percent of the U.S. gross domestic product.28 28Michael R. Bloomberg & Charles E. Schumer, Sustaining New York's and the US' Global Financial Services Leadership 10 ( Jan. 2007), available athttp://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf. The financial services industry is also one of the fastest-growing sectors in the U.S. economy.29 29 Id. Continued growth in this industry provides the United States with jobs and tax revenues.30 30 Id. at 9–10. To obtain such benefits, the United States needs to make sure that the benefits of listing in the United States for desirable foreign companies outweigh the costs. Foreign private issuers typically list in the United States for financial considerations such as increased liquidity, potentially lower cost of equity capital, a desire to increase their U.S. shareholder base, and ability to raise money from equity.31 31 See G. Andrew Karolyi, What Happens to Stocks That List Shares Abroad? A Survey of the Evidence and Its Managerial Implications 34–35 (Sept. 1996) (NYSE Working Paper No. 96-04), available athttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1612; Bancel, Franck & Mittoo, Usha R., European Managerial Perceptions of the Net Benefits of Foreign Stock Listings, 7 Eur. Fin. Mgmt. 213, 224– 25 (2001) (surveying European managers); Fanto, James A. & Karmel, Roberta S., A Report on the Attitudes of Foreign Companies Regarding a U.S. Listing, 3 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 51, 63– 66 (1997); Mittoo, Usha R., Managerial Perceptions of the Net Benefits of Foreign Listing: Canadian Evidence, 4 J. Int'l Fin. Mgmt & Acct. 40, 58 (1992) (surveying managers of Canadian companies cross-listed in the United States and the United Kingdom); Pagano, Marco et al., The Geography of Equity Listing: Why Do Companies List Abroad?, 57 J. Fin. 2651, 2685– 87 (2002) (looking at companies listed on ten major European exchanges and seeing who listed in the United States rather than in Europe). Listing in the United States also provides foreign private issuers with acquisition currency, prestige, and publicity.32 32 See Bancel & Mittoo, supra note 31, at 224–25; Fanto & Karmel, supra note 31, at 63–66. Some foreign private issuers list because all the companies in the relevant industry list in the United States.33 33 See Fanto & Karmel, supra note 31, at 52, 63–66. Another potential reason to list in the United States is that U.S. investors may be better able to identify which of the new, innovative firms are likely to succeed.34 34 See Asher Blass & Yishay Yafeh, Vagabond Shoes Longing to Stray: Why Foreign Firms List in the United States 16 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available athttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=248948. Previous studies have found that foreign private issuers' perceptions of the benefits of listing in the United States have a basis in reality. Studies have found that cross-listing in the United States leads to increased liquidity,35 35 See Foerster, Stephen R. & Karolyi, G. Andrew, International Listings of Stocks: The Case of Canada and the US, 24 J. Int'l Bus. Stud. 763, 773– 79 (1993) (looking at fifty-three Toronto Stock Exchange–listed stocks that listed on U.S. exchanges from 1981 to 1990); Karolyi, supra note 31, at decreased to domestic market See Foerster, Stephen R. & Karolyi, G. Andrew, The of Market and on Evidence from Foreign Stock Listing in the United States, J. Fin. (looking at firms from countries that listed in the United States between and Karolyi, supra note 31, at But see et al., of to Markets and Its on J. Int'l from between and that total risk decreased for firms but not for firms after the of the and increased See et al., International Cross-Listings and J. Fin. & Analysis (2002) from a study of a one before and one after a listed in the NYSE or Stock Exchange and from the number of a is in the and the Financial during the in that and increase after listing on the for foreign private issuers. to the cost of capital and increase share for foreign private issuers, both the and the of these effects are See & The Impact of an NYSE Listing on the Global of Stocks 2–3 (NYSE Working Paper No. foreign stocks listed on the NYSE between and and that stocks from developed markets on increase in home market value of trading after stocks from markets experience only a increase in home market et al., The Market Impact of The Case of 2 (1998) (looking at eight stocks listed in the United States or traded on markets between and and finding no of listing R. & Market and the of Capital in International Equity 35 J. Fin. & Analysis from foreign stocks that their first between and that cross-listing the cost of capital for foreign & Karolyi, supra note at that foreign stocks a significant during the before listing and also during the listing but that shares on during the after Karolyi, supra note 31, at 35 that share increased in the first after listing but that during the after listing The Market to International Evidence from J. Fin. Econ. from foreign stocks that their first between and that the of a listing were for firms that list on major U.S. & E., of Foreign Listings on U.S. J. Int'l Bus. Stud. effect from equity of foreign firms listed on the NYSE and the between and But see & J., Are to Rev. Fin. Stud. there an increase in there a for to several after listing and there of a effect on for firms While private for foreign private issuers tend to their home market on major U.S. public exchanges tend to the relevant et al., supra note at Foerster, Stephen R. & Karolyi, G. Andrew, The of Global Equity Offerings, 35 J. Fin. & Analysis Foreign private issuers obtain more of a if they from markets with lower accounting standards or lower of investor et al., supra note at & Karolyi, supra note at The increased may be because investors see a to list on an exchange with a environment as a of about its future 41 See C. & Disclosure and Listing on Foreign Stock J. & Fin. Listing in the United States may also increase the value of the shares because it the ability of a shareholder to private benefits from the See Doidge, Craig U.S. Cross-Listings and the Benefits of Evidence from J. Fin. Econ. that foreign firms that list in the United States and are subject to U.S. securities regulation tend to have lower than firms that do especially if these foreign firms are from countries with shareholder et al., supra note See also & Benefits of International J. Fin. (2004). and because it in non-U.S. firms and increased et al., and Does Listing in the United States a and Market 41 J. Acct. Foreign private issuers that list in the United States tend to their equity to and to into than do foreign companies not listed in the United Evidence from of U.S. The of Stock as an (Sept. (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available & Cross-Listings and Evidence, 34 Fin. Mgmt. Firms from regions list in the United States for For European issuers, the reason to list in the United States is better by and the desire to obtain acquisition See Jackson, Howell E. & Pan, Eric J., Regulatory Competition in International Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe in 1999—Part II, 3 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 224– 25 (2008); see also et al., supra note 31, at that of listing in the United States are the of and investors, than in Europe, and a The reasons firms list in the United States on their firms list to they can comply with the U.S. securities law requirements and to and is a less important because the market is M. Regulation of Issuers U.S. Public Equity Markets (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with on the other list to of increased and relative See at For issuers from other Asian the reason to U.S. markets is better from the liquidity, by 48 See Regulatory Competition in International Securities Markets: Evidence from in and (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Regulatory Competition in International Capital Markets: Evidence from in 3 J.L. & Bus. 61 Asian issuers have found that they to go to the U.S. market for transactions over See at 13, Some Asian and firms list in the United States because they their home listing supra note at In addition, the has encouraged some to list in the United States to to the of their for to comply with U.S. securities listed must effective Id. at 21; supra note at Finally, listing in the United States firms to convert their to U.S. allowing them to obtain acquisition supra note at firms list in the United States to be subject to lower if they are listed on a U.S.

The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the DC Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority

Public Interest Comment on Hedge Fund Investor Qualifications - The Definition of Accredited Investor in Certain Private Investment Vehicles

Purpose – To review guidance issued in April 2014 by the staff of the USA Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that clarifies how participants in regulated securities offerings, business combinations, proxy contests, and tender offers may transmit required cautionary statements and legends to the securities marketplace via social media technology platforms whose space limitations preclude display of the full text of the required statements. Design/methodology/approach – Examines the new SEC staff interpretative guidance in light of the tension between the disclosure requirements of the SEC’s communications rules and the characteristics of some social media platforms that do not permit compliance with the SEC rules in the same manner as traditional paper-based disclosure vehicles. Findings – The staff’s new guidance permits issuers and other parties to comply with the communications rules by using in their social media transmissions an active hyperlink that connects to the text of the required statements, thereby dispelling the legal uncertainty about the hyperlinking approach that has discouraged parties from using some social media outlets to disseminate information about their transactions. The article notes that the staff’s conditions place important limitations on the use of hyperlinks, especially in connection with the use of popular social media platforms such as LinkedIn, Facebook, and others that do not impose a cap on the number of characters or amount of text that may be included in a communication, and fails to address the permissibility of other approaches to overcoming the space limitations of some platforms. Originality/value – Provides expert guidance from experienced securities lawyers.

Examining Timely Disclosure of Material Information and the Privacy Concerns of Executive Officers

Improvements in SEC Economic Analysis Since Business Roundtable: A Structured Assessment

The Rise and Fall of the SEC in Bankruptcy

Comment Letter to the SEC on Climate Change Disclosures

Summary A key element in determining a project's commercial maturity is the evidence of a firm intent to proceed with development within a reasonable time frame. The Petroleum Resource Management System (PRMS) (SPE 2007) recommends 5 years as a benchmark, although a longer time can be applied in some cases. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also provides specific guidance and requirements on undeveloped reserves and the 5-year-maturation time limit. Despite the apparent clarity in the PRMS and SEC regulations regarding project maturity, this paper describes actual examples in the public domain in which different levels of commercial maturity were introduced within a project for proved and probable reserves as a result of the 5-year time limit. This has resulted in projects with their proved reserves reclassified as probable reserves because they will not be developed within the 5-year time limit. This paper reviews SPE standards and SEC wording on commercial maturity requirements and the 5-year time limit, providing clarity on whether a project's recoverable volumes should be classified as reserves or contingent resources if its undeveloped reserves are not matured into developed reserves within 5 years of their first reporting, and specific circumstances for a longer maturation time frame do not exist. When referring to projects with proved undeveloped reserves falling outside the 5-year time limit, the SEC uses different wording throughout the Final Rule document issued in January 2009 (NARA 2009). This has resulted in apparently different interpretations of the requirements for projects to meet this criterion. On the basis of the wording used in SEC forms 10-K and 20-F, public disclosures seem to range from reporting only the projects with undeveloped reserves that have been continuously disclosed for 5 years or more in the annual filings, to reporting all projects that have been or will remain undeveloped for 5 years or more from the time of their first disclosure date. Given the wording in the SEC Final Rule, it is understandable that different interpretations of the regulations may emerge. This paper presents an analysis of the SEC language used in the Final Rule and related wording used in SEC comment letters from the last few years. Failing further clarity from the SEC, this analysis provides the authors' opinion on the clarity required to ensure consistency in the way the SEC 5-year rule should be interpreted and in the spirit of comparability among companies that provides the basis for the SEC requirement to report these undeveloped reserves as a separate item. Another area discussed in this paper relates to the wording used by the SEC regarding a project's undeveloped-reserves volumes (i.e., its undeveloped reserves in barrels of oil equivalent) and the potential different interpretations that the industry may give to the SEC Final Rule. A simple example is presented to provide clarity on the option that is most likely to meet the SEC requirements. Potential inconsistencies resulting from different interpretation are highlighted. The analysis and recommendations presented in this paper aim at creating consistent approaches leading to better comparability among oil and gas companies by use of an aligned interpretation of standards and requirements for reserves estimation, classification, categorization, and disclosure.

Since a prior paper on analogy for estimating petroleum reserves (Hodgin and Harrell 2006), new dimensions of this topic have emerged. This paper provides updated guidance for analogy use and explains new concepts for the application of analogy in reserves estimation and classification. Reserves evaluators using engineering and geoscience techniques now have new petroleum reserves rulesthat include the use of analogy. In 2007, the SPE finalized the Petroleum Resource Management System (PRMS) instructions and, in late 2008, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) published updated regulations on reserves reporting. Recent papers (Lee 2009 and Etherington 2009) provide good summaries of the updated SEC rules and a comparison to PRMS. This paper will provide guidance to aid understanding of and compliance with these rules as related to the use of analogs. The paper provides interpretations of new analogy-related terminology and the related reserves rules. It also gives examples of how these interpretations can be applied to common reserves estimation situations where analogy is used. The paper also addresses new concepts of how analogies can be shown as valid and adjusted for minor differences in the comparison of target field to analogy field. The recent publication of the US SEC reserves reporting rules, which draw partially from the SPE PRMS, has increased interest in deeper understanding of both these SEC rules and PRMS. This paper will assist those who develop and use petroleum reserves data in understanding how the use of analogy can contribute to reliable reserves estimates and proper classification.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the United States of North America has modernized in December 2008 its regulations for the report of oil and gas reserves. From now on, the oil and gas companies will be able to report reserves of bituminous sands, the economic evaluation of reserves will be made with an yearly average price instead of the price of the last day of the year, the use of (reliable) technology will be allowed to demonstrate the producibility and the (lateral) continuity of production of the reservoirs as well as to determine the fluid contacts. Also, it will be authorized to publish, voluntarily, probable and possible reserves that previously were explicitly prohibited in the SEC reports. One of the important changes that concern to the petrophysicist is the qualification of Reliable Technology to support or demonstrate the producibility of the reservoirs without having a conclusive test. Using technology the petrophysicist will also be involved in fluid contacts determination and in the construction of analogy of the reservoir of interest with other reservoirs at a more advanced stage of development. The use of reliable technology is also enabled to support the estimate of proved undeveloped reserves at greater distances than the development spacing in the field provided that reasonable certainty of the production continuity is obtained by using such technology. The intrinsic technical uncertainty in reserves estimations often makes the estimators to adopt a probabilistic estimate instead of a deterministic one. The use of probabilistic estimates has become frequent in the industry and now the SEC has defined that estimates of proved reserves can be made either deterministically or probabilistically. When a probabilistic estimate is chosen, or when in occasions the petrophysical parameters of an in essence deterministic estimate (net thickness, porosity and saturation of water) are chosen based on a probabilistic approach of the distribution of those parameters, the petrophysicist will have to observe some basic premises to avoid misinterpretations. Also, in the next years, operators and service providers will be embarked in an effort to find new tools and methodologies for reservoir evaluation and reserves estimation that allow them to value their properties with reasonable certainty still at the early stages of development. This will take place under a modernized regulatory framework that will enable the use of the most modern technologies provided that they can offer consistent, repetitive, and reasonably certain results on the expected answer of the reservoir.

Usually financial advisers are paid primarily or entirely according to the value of the assets they manage—that is, the assets under management (AUM). Increasingly, they have a fiduciary duty and use AUM-based fees. This compensation model results in an incentive to maximize AUM, which is widely considered to be a desirable feature. This article examines a class of situations in which that incentive may cause a conflict of interest and lead to advice, or the lack of advice, that is not in the clients’ best interests. Advisers have an incentive to avoid recommending actions that would decrease their AUM. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) relies on an outmoded economic model that views disclosure as an adequate remedy to conflicts of interest. However, the SEC does not require disclosure of the types of conflicts discussed here. This article examines alternative compensation models, such as by the hour. Recognizing that information and the ability to process it are scarce and valuable resources, a more efficient use of resources may be to provide specialization in financial literacy through advisers, rather than to expect widespread financial literacy, at least in some areas. Changing the way the SEC regulates financial advice could improve that approach. This article examines effects of the new SEC rules in those types of situations. Changes in the SEC regulatory approach are recommended. <b>TOPICS:</b>Long-term/retirement investing, pension funds, retirement, social security, wealth management <b>Key Findings</b> • Financial advisers’ AUM-based compensation may affect the advice they provide if it concerns the scope of assets they manage; for example, a failure to advise beneficial options that would result in reducing the adviser’s AUM. • The AUM-based model of adviser compensation may not result in the best advice concerning the payout phase. • It may be more efficient for financial literacy to be a specialized skill in some areas, such as pension investing, but clients who are not financially literate may not be able to evaluate whether they are receiving good advice.

Regulatory Path Dependency in Securities Regulation: Evidence from Israel and U.S.

PurposeTo explain the recent determination by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with respect to so-called “token sales” or “initial coin offerings” (ICOs) that some tokens may be securities under federal securities laws and to address other recent actions by the SEC with respect to ICOs.Design/methodology/approachReviews the SEC’s determination that some tokens issued in an ICO may be securities under federal securities laws as outlined by the SEC’s Division of Enforcement in a “Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO.” Provides overview of SEC Investor Alert, Investor Bulletin, and recent comments and actions of the Staff regarding investment in ICOs and provides guidance to those interested in participating in an ICO as an investor or issuer.FindingsThese actions by the SEC make it clear that the SEC is closely monitoring the market for ICOs, and that it wants potential investors and issuers to be aware that it is watching and may take action if it believes the securities laws have been violated.Originality/valuePractical overview of recent developments and guidance from experienced securities and financial services lawyers.

Since its founding, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has employed a disclosure-enforcement framework, combined with a cooperative relationship with the securities industry, as the key means of ensuring market legitimacy and investor confidence. This article argues that not only is this framework deeply rooted within the SEC, but is equally ingrained in the public psyche. It is the deep belief of the public in this "prosecutorial orientation” that has sustained the SEC's disclosure-enforcement framework in the face of charges of obsolescence, inefficiency and agency capture. But as the SEC is increasingly called upon to concern itself with questions of efficiency and capital formation in the global economy, the stage may be set for a shift away from the disclosure-enforcement orientation and towards a more active, "promotional role" in the economy. In addition to external market forces, however, any qualitative shift in the SEC's regulatory mission will be affected only if there is a comparable shift in the public philosophy regarding the SEC's regulatory intent and a change in the internal orientation of the SEC. The author contends that seeds of these changes have long since been sowed.