The Single-Minded Animal: Shared Intentionality, Normativity, and the Foundations of Discursive Cognition

Abstract

Preston Stovall's book is rich in details and covers in broad strokes some very important themes within philosophy of language and intentionality. I will in this review discuss what I think are three main theses that Stovall wishes to establish and one methodological premise that Stovall adopts to go about his business. The methodological premise that is at the heart of Stovall's project is what he calls psychological nominalism. Psychological nominalism is the Sellarsian idea that our awareness of things or facts (or any epistemic stance for that matter) is a linguistic affair. In other words, to explain how humans are rational and norm-governed beings, Stovall says that we need to construct a model where discursive cognition of humans is understood in terms of language-use. The three main theses of Stovall's book, as I see them, are these: (1) Intentional-Deontic Continuity; (2) Normativity of Cognition; and (3) The Ontological Priority of the Collective. The first thesis, I call a ‘continuity’ thesis because Stovall wants to show that there is a continuous line of cognitive development that can be traced from the pre-linguistic to the proto-linguistic to fully sapient behaviour. That is, Stovall makes the claim that we can posit a continuous evolutionary line from sentient existence, which is intentional action of the non-rational animal kingdom, to full-bodied sapient human existence which involves the use of language and the ability to self-reflect on rules of linguistic engagement.