Abstract

Most of the researchers analyzed the impact of ownership structure on dividends and capital structure decisions separately. Drawing upon preceding empirical studies, the interdependence between dividends and capital structure raises the potential of the endogeneity bias when interdependent factors are segmented. Therefore, this study examined the effect of corporate ownership structure on capital structure and dividend policy simultaneously. This study utilized 407 Malaysian-listed firms over the period from 2012 to 2016 and adopted simultaneous modelling using 2SLS and 3SLS regression techniques. The results changed markedly in sign, magnitude and significance when moving from OLS estimator to 2SLS and 3SLS estimators. The findings show that both dividend and capital structure policies have positive interdependence. The substantial, family, government and foreign ownership affect dividends positively and capital structure negatively. The study provides various theoretical and practical implications to improve corporate governance and corporate financial policies. This study contributes to the growing literature on corporate finance and corporate ownership. Particularly, it provides simultaneous investigation on the effect of family, government and foreign ownership on dividends and capital structure for Malaysian firms.

Highlights

  • The interaction between ownership structure, dividends and capital structure theoretically referred to the agency theory

  • Both capital structure and dividend policy are proven as governance mechanisms to alleviate the agency problem in firms

  • Based on studies of Malaysian firms, the mean value of leverage ratio ranged between 31% as reported by Lean et al (2011) and 15.28% as reported by Suhaila et al (2008)

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Summary

Introduction

The interaction between ownership structure, dividends and capital structure theoretically referred to the agency theory. In firms with widely dispersed ownership, the managers will not always act in the best interest of the shareholders and to limit the divergences from shareholders’ interests, appropriate monitoring shall be established to limit the aberrant activities (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The types and compositions of firms’ ownership structure are important factors that influence the level of agency problem and constitute the governance system. Both capital structure and dividend policy are proven as governance mechanisms to alleviate the agency problem in firms. To avoid managers’ unfavorable actions, shareholders strive to distribute as much as possible of free cash flow as dividends and place the managers under capital market monitor (Easterbrook, 1984; Rozeff, 1982)

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