Abstract

This paper examines how a regulatory authority might ideally promote the formation of “conservation clubs” among households in order to initiate and empower voluntary household-level water and energy conservation efforts. We characterize a socially optimal conservation benchmark and derive the conditions necessary for a club to effectively attain this benchmark on behalf of the wider community. Both theoretical and numerical analyses are used to demonstrate ways in which households choose to become club members and are subsequently empowered to undertake conservation efforts. The avenues through which club membership might empower households include (1) information provision/education that is assumed to alter key parameters of the household’s welfare function, thereby inducing the household to build a stronger “conservation ethic,” and (2) bulk-pricing arrangements that reduce the prices of applicable conservation technologies. Our results highlight key relationships between the regulator and households, as well as between the club and the marketplace, that should be measured empirically before efforts are made to establish conservation clubs in practice.

Highlights

  • This paper examines how a regulatory authority might ideally promote the formation of “conservation clubs” among households in order to initiate and empower voluntary household-level water and energy conservation efforts

  • This paper has examined how a “conservation club” might empower voluntary household-level conservation effort

  • Theoretical analysis has demonstrated the ways in which households choose to become club members and are subsequently empowered to undertake aggressive conservation efforts

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Summary

Introduction

As a result of water utility inertia and the absence of any silver bullet for local governments, the need for novel approaches to motivate voluntary household-level water and energy conservation is readily apparent. In this paper we focus attention on two overriding issues of club formation and function: (1) how households determine whether to join the club, and (2) conditions that must be satisfied in order for the club to effectively attain a socially efficient level of aggregate conservation effort on behalf of the wider community of households (Note 10).

The Basic Model
A Pareto Efficient Benchmark
Conservation Clubs
A Numerical Model of Conservation Clubs
Summary and Conclusions

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