The Significance of Wittgenstein\u2019s Remarks on Religious Belief

Jan Wawrzyniak

doi:10.1007/s11406-021-00323-9

Abstract

This article aims to show that Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious belief and religious statements can be understood in modest philosophical terms, consistent with the thought that they are neither intended as serving to justify or undermine religious beliefs, nor as the expression of any theorizing about the nature of religious belief or the meaning of religious language. Instead, their philosophical significance is held to consist in their functioning to remind us of what we already know about the latter: such things as in what circumstances one utters religious statements, what the consequences of accepting or rejecting religious beliefs are, and so on. His position is that all attempts to say something more than this are either a mark of philosophical arrogance or a manifestation of one’s own personal commitment to adopting a stance of religious belief or non-belief. As such, they do not furnish us with genuine philosophical insights. I argue that such an interpretation possess two principal merits. Firstly, it demonstrates that there is no tension between Wittgenstein’s remarks on the nature of philosophy and his remarks on religious belief and religious statements. Secondly, it shows that it is possible to philosophize about religion in a manner that does not assume that this has to consist either in presenting an apology for or critique of religion or in formulating philosophical theories regarding the nature of religious belief and the meaning of religious language.

Highlights

The aim of this text is to consider Wittgenstein’s approach to religious faith, and to explain how he understood the difference between religious belief and non-belief
We may wonder why it is that Wittgenstein seeks to draw attention to the questions just discussed that pertain to religious beliefs and utterances
Among other things, a clarification of the role played by religious beliefs and utterances in the lives of believers and non-believers

Summary

Introduction

The aim of this text is to consider Wittgenstein’s approach to religious faith, and to explain how he understood the difference between religious belief and non-belief. In particular, I would like to focus on what it is, according to him, that philosophy can say about religious faith. Afterwards, my step will be to show that Wittgenstein’s answers to these questions need not be interpreted as theses constitutive of some philosophical theory of religion My discussion of this point, which I take to be crucial where giving a proper and adequate interpretation of Wittgenstein’s remarks on religion is concerned, includes an examination of the following objection to his philosophy of religion: namely, that his remarks on religious belief and religious assertions are incompatible with what believers themselves say about them. I end my considerations by concluding that the aim of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion is, in a sense, a very modest one His remarks can be understood as reminders which only try to present, and not to explain, those features of religious beliefs and utterances that are right before our – i.e. both believers’ and non-believers’ – eyes

Is there any Such Thing as Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Religion?

Does a Non‐believer Contradict a Believer?

The Role of Faith in the Lives of Believers

The Role of Pictures in Religion

Does Wittgenstein Embrace a Philosophical View Concerning Religion?

Concluding Summary