Abstract
To explain perceptual justification, McDowell proposes so-called “conceptualism,” the view that the content of experience is all conceptual. Tony Cheng, in his book, John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity (2021), suggests that McDowell can do without conceptualism. To support his suggestion, Cheng makes several contentions against McDowell’s thesis of the co-extensiveness of conceptuality and rationality. In this commentary, I focus on two most crucial contentions Cheng makes: (i) conceptualism is an extra commitment for explaining perceptual justification and (ii) it can be replaced by a suitable structural constraint on non-conceptual content. First, I clarify McDowell’s co-extensiveness thesis and his conception of the conceptual. Then, based on my clarifications, I defend conceptualism against the two contentions.
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