THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CARE ETHICS FOR MEDICAL ETHICS

Abstract

Happiness construed in the Aristotelian eudaemonic sense is the primary constituent of, if not identical to, human well-being. Human well-being is in turn the primary aim of medical practice and thus ought to be the primary value that the ethics of medical practice, i.e. Medical Ethics (construed generally) are concerned about. It may seem then that all Medical Ethics, being united in its central concern, should yield to a unified treatment. However, this seeming platitude has faced some resistance in the Nursing Ethics community. Many in the Nursing Ethics community think that nursing being based on caring for the patient the ethical issues arising therein require an ethics of caring and therefore an ethics of care. However, some have taken this to mean that Nursing Ethics requires a separate ethics from Medical Ethics in general. But, historically Medical Ethics as a whole is itself rooted in Humean sentimentalist moral philosophy which an ethics of care, or Care Ethics – a normative ethics based in the notion of Care – can claim to embody well given a sentimentalist notion of Care a la Michael Slote. Thus, I shall argue, Care Ethics offers the possibility of a conciliation for Medical Ethics. Some also argue that Care Ethics is too confused and unsystematic to provide a proper basis for any kind of ethical understanding. I sketch how a Care Ethics based in the understanding of Care as a sentimental motive, in the manner of Slote, has the resources to defend against this charge.