The Shaking of America: September 11th Becomes History

Abstract

J. Samuel Walker’s new book focuses on why the United States failed to prevent the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as the experiences of that day and the U.S. policy response. This study efficiently summarizes this history and makes some important arguments, but its lack of historical contextualization and failure to differentiate itself within the extensive scholarship on this topic limit its usefulness. Walker’s most interesting arguments examine pre-2001 counterterrorism policy and intelligence, including the shortcomings that made September 11th possible. For instance, he offers a compelling defense of U.S. President Bill Clinton’s administration’s counterterrorism policies. He shows that Clinton devoted more resources than any previous president to counterterrorism, doubling federal spending between 1995 and 2000. He launched missile strikes on targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, took effective financial action against terrorist groups, and put massive diplomatic pressure on Afghanistan to give up Osama Bin Laden and on Pakistan to pressure Afghanistan to cut ties to al-Qaeda. However, Clinton’s counterterrorism efforts bumped against constraints such as vague intelligence about al-Qaeda, the limits of U.S. ability to influence Pakistani foreign policy, and the lack of political support for bolder military action.