Abstract
GAMES consisting of several repetitions of an original game are discussed. Each player's pay-off is defined as the sum of his pay-offs in the individual repetitions with certain weights. For a given coalition, the concept of an attainable vector is defined. A dependence is established between the sets of attainable vectors for different numbers of repetitions. A necessary and sufficient condition is found for the attainability of a vector after a sufficiently large number of repetitions. The case when information is available about the opponents' strategies is considered. The use of mixed strategies is examined.
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