THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, COURT‐CURBING AND JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY ERRATUM

Abstract

In “The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy” (American Journal of Political Science 53 (4): 971-89 (2009)), there is a slight error in the proof of Proposition 3. Specifically, Congress’s (C ’s) payoff from deviating to a pure strategy, !(! = L ) = h should be given by (1 − m)bc − mbc − e. C ’s strategy from playing a pure strategy !(! = L ) = l is given by e − bc . Thus, the mixing probability that makes C indifferent between playing!(! = H) = l and!(! = H) = h is m = bc−e bc . This probability holds for all bc > e. Thus, the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 3 exists for all bc > e. Note that this correction does not affect the substantive interpretation of the model or the empirical implications derived. In the article, analysis was constrained to the case where bc 2e, it was asserted there exists a pooling equilibrium in which the Court never makes a constrained decision upon observing Court curbing. The comparative static derived was that as bc increases—as the Court and Congress become more ideologically divergent—the Court should be less likely to make a constrained decision upon observing Court curbing. The algebraic correction reveals that the semi separating equilibrium holds for all b > e, and the restriction that bc < 2e is not necessary. However, the probability with which the Court makes an unconstrained decision upon observing Court curbing (! = h), m = bc−e bc , is increasing in bc . Thus, the prediction that judicial restraint in response to Court curbing should decrease as Congress becomes more ideologically divergent from the Court continues to hold.