The Sensitivity of Pressurized Thermal Shock Analysis Results to Alternative Models for Weld Flaw Distributions

Abstract

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) initiated a comprehensive project in 1999 to determine if improved technologies can provide a technical basis to reduce the conservatism in the current regulations for pressurized thermal shock (PTS) while continuing to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection to public health and safety. A relaxation of PTS regulations could have profound implications for plant license renewal considerations. During the PTS re-evaluation study, an improved risk-informed computational methodology was developed that provides a more realistic characterization of PTS risk. This updated methodology was recently applied to three commercial PWRs. The results of this study provide encouragement that a technical basis can be established to support a relaxation of current PTS regulations. One significant model improvement applied in the PTS re-evaluation study was the development of flaw databases derived from the non-destructive and destructive examinations of material from cancelled reactor pressure vessels (RPV). Empirically-based statistical distributions derived from these databases and expert illicitation were used to postulate the number, size, and location of flaws in welded and base metal (plate and forging) regions of an RPV during probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) analyses of RPVs subjected to transient loading conditions such as PTS. However, limitations in the available flaw data have required assumptions to be made to complete the risk-based flaw models. Sensitivity analyses were performed to evaluate the impact of four flaw-related assumptions. Analyses addressed: 1) truncations of distributions to exclude flaws of extreme depth dimensions, 2) vessel-to-vessel differences in flaw data, 3) large flaws observed in weld repair regions, and 4) the basis for estimating the number of surface breaking flaws. None of the four alternate weld flaw models significantly impacted calculated vessel failure frequencies or invalidated the tentative conclusions derived from the USNRC PTS re-evaluation study.