The sense of atrocity and the passion for justice

Abstract

A penal ethics for today examines the connections between affect and morality. It scrutinises closely the felt moralities within the apprehension of crime. These felt moralities underpin interventions that are seemingly mobilised by a passion for justice. A penal ethics questions whether these sensibilities really do move moral actors as just feelings. This proposition is readily defended by reference to the emotive moralism in some notable areas. These include legitimation of the death penalty as ‘closure’ for victims, and the emergent imperative to wage ‘virtuous’ wars. Developing an ethics that challenges the contemporary penal field requires a sophisticated theoretical elaboration. An approach of this kind entails the conceptual determination and phenomenological analysis of moral sensibilities. This essay accordingly explores the feeling of being moved by a sense of atrocity. It considers the feeling of being moved to respond justly to one globally noted death from crime. This was a death thought to have reinforced the West’s sense of moral purpose in the movement toward ‘virtuous war’ upon an Iraqi regime framed as ‘brutal’.