Abstract
In this contribution we will address the main puzzling empirical issues that have been formulated around Free Indirect Discourse (FID): the constraints on the use of first person pronouns and of proper names (as well as of definite descriptions), the reasons why different grammatical features (person, gender, number) give rise to presuppositions that must be resolved at different levels of interpretation in FID, the factors that account for the observation that person and tense behave similarly in FID. At the same time, we will also discuss the main controversies to which the ongoing debate on FID has given rise in the literature, showing that Schlenker (Mind Lang 19(3):279–304, 2004)’s distinction between a Context of Thought (CT) and a Context of Utterance (CU) still provides a fundamentally valid insight into the nature of FID, in spite of many qualifications that are necessary and some well-motivated criticism. However, our main task here is more ambitious than simply taking a stand on the many unsettled controversies surrounding FID. In fact, we claim that Schlenker’s split between CU and CT can be derived in a principled way from the inner nature of FID as a linguistic process of ‘phenomenal identification’, whereby a Higher Experiencer attempts at reproducing (at a distinct time) the phenomenal experience proper to a Lower Experiencer. This distinction between qualitatively identified but numerically distinct experiences provides the conceptual basis for the derivation of virtually all remarkable properties of FID (including its somehow intermediate status between Direct and Indirect Discourse), while connecting, at the same time, with some intriguing semantic properties of first-person pronouns, such as the different varieties of de se readings.
Highlights
Free Indirect Discourse (FID) is a narrative style that is used to report the words or thoughts of a character.1 Its correct semantic characterization as well as its precise status with respect to direct and indirect discourse is still largely debated
We will see how these puzzles may be solved by means of the following ingredients: (i) FID involves phenomenal identification; (ii) Schlenker’s distinction between Context of Thought (CT) and Context of Utterance (CU) plays a significant theoretical role; (iii) the interpretative behavior of pronominal features and tenses with respect to CT and CU depends on the properties of phenomenal identification; (iv) the eccentric behavior of first-person pronouns and proper names in FID depends on the conditions regulating the relationship between CT and CU, as imposed by the nature of FID as a process of phenomenal identification
In (22) Mrs Cabot is aware in CT of the fact that the person she is talking to is named Ortcutt, whereas she is not aware that this person is () named Arnie. It follows that the semantics of the second-person pronoun that would occur in direct discourse (“You’ve had your last chance with me, and you’ve blown it”) can be reconstructed only at the level of CU in (22a), where the narrator is aware of the extensional identity between Arnie and Mrs Cabot’s interlocutor, whereas it can already be reconstructed at the level of CT in (22b), where Mrs Cabot herself, as the protagonist, is aware of the identity between Ortcutt and her interlocutor
Summary
FID is a narrative style that is used to report the words or thoughts of a character.1 Its correct semantic characterization as well as its precise status with respect to direct and indirect discourse is still largely debated.
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