Abstract
Given a so‐called naturalistic theory of mental content (of the sort urged by Fodor and others), one might be able to maintain that certain biochemical events have the very mental contents that some mental events have, thereby avoiding many arguments against identity theses. But given the arguments, one cannot assume that there is a naturalistic theory to be had. And by drawing on Stalnaker, we can sketch an account of ‘where content comes from’ given which, it is implausible that biochemical events have mental content.
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