The self-defeating game: how state capacity and policy choice affect political survival

Abstract

ABSTRACTPolitical science has dedicated extensive attention to the determinants of regime change as well as its relation to state capacity. Less work has focused on incumbent political survival and state capacity. Building on selectorate theory [Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press], we suggest that the chance of the party of the incumbent remaining in office is partially a function of the capacity of the state they hold power over. However, we also hypothesize that state capacity volatility decreases an incumbent’s chances of winning elections. To empirically test these hypotheses, the article uses a cross country statistical analysis complemented by illustrative case studies of policy making from Armenia and Georgia. The analyses support the above two hypotheses, showing that if the incumbent increases state capacity, it increases their chances of staying in office. However, capacity volatility decreases their chances of survival. While Georgian state capacity developed in fits, jumps, and starts, in Armenia state capacity developed at a slow and steady pace for most of its independence. As the aphorism goes, slow and steady wins the race with politicians being thrown out of office in Georgia and the incumbent in Armenia maintaining its power. Based on the article’s analyses, we suggest that a self-defeating game is at work for reformers.