The self-concept, identity, and alienation from self

Abstract

T HE BEGINNINGS Of neurotic development are generally at t r ibuted to disturbances of childhood growth, disturbances which affect the formation and organization of the self. T h e various psychoanalytic theories differ in their emphasis on the factors involved in the child, in its environment, or in the relationship between the two. T h e thesis presented in this paper is that ~haracteristic developmental changes of the self occur during the maturat ive growth of the young child, along with and parallel to neurot ic developmen~ I believe that these two processes intertwine and mutual ly modify each other in certain definable ways. While a holistic theory of neurosis may satisfactorily explain the driving forces, the motivational processes, and the form of the neurotic personality, the explanation of many part icular aspects can best be found in modifying influences of this early self-development. I have previously tried to point out that different conceptions of the self among the various analytic schools derive from functional principles. 1 Now it has become evident that consideration of the growing self must also take into account certain differences with the adult. In the adult the self we deal with at any specific moment represents the confluence of two dimensions of experience. First is the historical or longitudinal, with the newborn infant and the mature adult at the two extremes. Second is the dimension of immediate experience in the here-and-now, the horizontal, with the internal and the external world as the two limits. T h e infant has Iess of an experienced past to the extent that he is young; this gradually changes as he grows chronologically with more lived experience to influence him. T h e infant's inner world first predominates in importance over the outer one. This changes as his awareness of the external world grows through the maturat ion of sensory and intellectual capacities, and as his communicative and symbolizing abilities develop. Because these formative processes are more active in the child, it is possible to distinguish more easily the various aspects of the self. As Piaget, Gesell, and others have shown, the infant begins to become aware of himself as a bounded entity, an experiencing "I," very early. As we consider this early awareness of self, several components may be differentiated. I do not conceive of these as actual organic entities, bu t ra ther as more or less organized aspects or functions of the total unitary organism in process. I t is simply convenient to make these distinctions in order to bet ter clarify