The self-concept as a basis for a theory of motivation

Abstract

It is becoming increasingly clear that social psychology, at least the sociological branch, needs to develop a theory of motivation. Calls for such efforts have taken several forms. Coleman (1986) and Giddens (1979) state that we lack a theory of action in sociology, which has hampered explication of the connection between the individual and society. Coleman's recommendation is to develop a voluntaristic theory of action along the lines initiated by Parsons in The Structure of Social Action (1937). Giddens's approach is to develop a theory of the subject (within his larger theory of “structuration”) involving a stratified model of personality consisting of the unconscious, practical consciousness, and discursive consciousness – a creative utilization of ideas drawn primarily from Freud, Marx, and Mead. For Ralph Turner (1988), the issue is how do persons affect the institutions within which they live, and how are they in turn affected by these institutions? Turner suggests this connection could be developed by focusing on that aspect of personality involving social roles. But the problem is most frequently stated in explicitly motivational terms, that is, that we need to develop a theory of motivation that is explicit, parsimonious, and sociologically defensible (McMahon, 1984; Emmet, 1976; Miyamoto, 1970; J. Turner, 1987).