Abstract
A bicooperative game is defined by a worth function on the set of ordered pairs of disjoint coalitions of players. The aim of this paper is to analyze the selectope for bicooperative games. This solution concept was introduced by Hammer et al. (1977) [20] and studied by Derks et al. (2000) [10] for cooperative games. We show the relations between the selectope, the core and the Weber set and obtain a characterization of almost positive bicooperative games as bicooperative games such that the core, the Weber set and the selectope coincide. Moreover, an axiomatic characterization of the elements of the selectope is obtained.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
