The Selective Enforcement of Government Regulation: Battleground States and the EPA

Abstract

This paper examines whether government regulation is selectively enforced. In the United States, the Electoral College system determines the outcome of presidential elections. This system creates incentives for politicians to direct policy favors to those states that represent the median voter in the Electoral College (so-called or swing states). In this paper, we examine whether regulators treat battleground states more favorably than non-battleground states. Specifically, we examine the probability that the EPA will find a facility in violation of the Clean Water Act if it is located in a battleground state relative to those located in non-battleground states. We find that violation rates for facilities located in battleground states are significantly lower than those in non-battleground states. Identification is obtained by the analysis of the violation rates of similar facilities located across the border between battleground and non-battleground states using a number of analytical frameworks, including difference-in-difference estimates for facilities located in states that change battleground status.