Abstract
AbstractIt is very challenging on designing cryptographically strong security functions that can be incorporated into low‐cost radio frequency identification (RFID) tags. Some RFID authentication protocols were proposed using only ultra‐lightweight primitives, while the security of them must be scrutinized before being put forth into any real application. In this paper, we present two effective attacks, namely de‐synchronization attack and full‐disclosure attack, against an efficient ultra‐lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol: LMAP 2, which is recently proposed by Peris‐Lopez et al. These active attacks are so serious as they cannot only disable the authentication capability of an RFID tag by destroying synchronization between the tag and the RFID reader, but also disclose all secret values stored in the tag. We point out the design flaws of the protocol and based on that, we improve the protocol with a stateful variant (SLMAP). The improved protocol is more secure in sense of tag anonymity, man‐in‐the‐middle (MITM) resistance, and forgery prevention as shown in our analysis, and is more compact due to reduced operations and memory usage on implementing such a tag. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
