The securitisation of NGOs post-9/11

Abstract

This article argues that the securitisation of an issue can involve not only negative, exclusionary and repressive extraordinary measures but also more positive, inclusionary and productive strategies of engagement. It also argues that such bifurcated strategies of security can evoke a spectrum of responses that sets limits on the process of securitisation. It examines these two arguments through the lens of the securitisation of development NGOs post-9/11. Development NGOs have become associated as a potential ‘second-order’ security issue related to the macro-securitisation of the War on Terror. After the launch of President Bush's War on Terror, US and allied governments shifted their approach to development NGOs from one of enthusiastically courting them as co-producers of development and security to an approach that cast greater suspicion on their activities. Aware that development NGOs still had a positive role to play in development and security, Western governments adopted a bifurcated strategy of containment and engagement towards development NGOs. State attempts to restrict development NGOs have evoked a spectrum of responses, ranging from ready compliance to outright resistance that has led to only partial success in securitising development NGOs.