Abstract
David Hume is widely believed to be one of the founders of functionalism. His principles of association are seen as an early attempt to articulate a mechanics of the mind akin to Newtonian mechanics. It is argued that this view is based on a failure to appreciate that Hume's skepticism about reason extends to our ability to understand the representation of everyday knowledge. For Hume there are “secret operations” of the mind, operations for which functional explanations are not forthcoming. Hume's place in the history of cognitive science is reevaluated in light of his views on common sense knowledge and belief formation.
Full Text 
Sign-in/Register to access full text options
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Published version (
Free)
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
