Abstract
This paper investigates the problem of secret key generation over a wiretap channel when the terminals observe correlated sources. These sources are independent of the main channel and the users overhear them before the transmission takes place. A novel outer bound is proposed and, employing a previously reported inner bound, the secret key capacity is derived under certain less-noisy conditions on the channel or source components. This result improves upon the existing literature where the more stringent condition of degradedness is required. Furthermore, numerical evaluation of the achievable scheme and previously reported results for a binary model are presented; a comparison of the numerical bounds provides insights on the benefit of the chosen scheme.
Highlights
The wiretap channel, introduced by Wyner [1], is the basic model for analyzing secrecy in wireless communications
The results and tools introduced in this work have connections to ones in a previous work of ours [28], where we studied both the secrecy capacity and the secret key capacity of the wiretap channel with generalized feedback
We note that the achievable secret key rate in Equation (5) is a combination of the secret bits transmitted through the noisy channel in the manner of the wiretap channel and the secret bits obtained by the reconstruction of the source at Bob
Summary
The wiretap channel, introduced by Wyner [1], is the basic model for analyzing secrecy in wireless communications. The secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel is defined as the maximum transmission rate that can be attained with zero leakage In their influential paper [2], Csiszár and Körner determined the rate-equivocation region of a general broadcast channel with any arbitrary level of security, which establishes the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel. Alice and Bob can safely communicate over a noiseless public broadcast channel as long as they share a secret key The rate of this key, must be at least as large as the rate of the message to attain zero leakage. We study the problem of secret key generation over a wiretap channel with correlated sources at each terminal It is assumed that each node acquires the n-sequence observation of its corresponding source before the communication begins
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