The Second Creek War: Interethnic Conflict and Collusion on a Collapsing Frontier (review)

Abstract

Reviewed by: The Second Creek War: Interethnic Conflict and Collusion on a Collapsing Frontier Christina Snyder The Second Creek War: Interethnic Conflict and Collusion on a Collapsing Frontier. By John T. Ellisor. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2010. 512 pp. $50.00. ISBN 978-0-8032-2548-0. In 1836, James Belser, editor of the Montgomery Advertiser, declared, "the war with the Creeks is all a humbug . . . a base and diabolical scheme, devised by interested men" (p. 179). Most historians have overlooked this event, but those who have side with Belser. Dubbing it the "so-called Second Creek War," historians depict the conflict as a ruthless act by white settlers who, in an attempt to steal Creek land and resources and force their removal, lashed out against the hapless, ailing Creeks. Not so, says John Ellisor. He argues that "the war was more than a sudden, desperate affair. It was the culmination of a long contest between Georgians and Creeks for land and resources" (p. 2). In this, the first long study of the Second Creek War, Ellisor contends that the Creeks were not merely provoked victims, but rather agents who planned the war with the goal of driving settlers out of New Alabama (formerly the Creek Nation). This richly detailed and nuanced history explores the [End Page 65] complicated nature of both Creek and Alabama society, demonstrating how the diverse, fractious, and competitive nature of each contributed to escalating violence. The mid-1830s were particularly volatile, transitional years for Alabamians and Creeks alike. The Creek Nation, which once controlled much of present-day Georgia and Alabama as well as northern Florida, had been forced into eastern Alabama. Alabama had extended its state laws over Creeks, disbanded their tribal government, and extended jurisdiction over the Creeks while barring them from testifying in court. The 1832 Treaty of Cusseta divided what was left of the Creek Nation into individual allotments. In theory, Creeks could remain in Alabama on these allotments or sell them and emigrate to Indian Territory. In practice, however, many Georgians and Alabamians did all they could to swindle Creeks out of their allotments: speculators bribed Indians to impersonate other Indians and then sell their land; the Columbus Land Company hired black interpreters called "strikers" to harass Creeks; settlers resorted to intimidation and even murder to drive Creeks from their homes. John B. Hogan, superintendant of Creek Removal, remarked, "a greater mass of corruption perhaps has never been congregated in any part of the world than has been engendered by the Creek treaty" (p. 127). Some Creeks and Indian countrymen (whites with Creek families) participated in the land frauds, while other Creeks clashed violently with one another. Although southern whites generally agreed that Indian removal was a necessity, they differed on the how and when. In one of Ellisor's most intriguing recoveries, he demonstrates how some white speculators, creditors, and planters tried to detain the Creeks in Alabama long enough to drain native people of as much land, property, and labor as possible. Ellisor depicts the war as a bottom-up revolt in which poorer Lower Creeks, who had lost their allotments by 1836, sought to resist removal, recover their nation, assert their independence, "and most importantly, fee[d] themselves" (p. 158). Scattered conflict broke out in early 1836, but the real start of the war, according to Ellisor, came in May, when Lower Creek warriors struck out against isolated travelers and stagecoaches on the Federal and New Roads and captured the town of Roanoke. But not all Creeks joined the fight: most Upper Creeks, led by Opothle Yahola, opposed the war, and hundreds of Upper Creek warriors mustered to protect Alabama citizens; others, seeking to avoid both conflict and removal, fled to the Cherokees or the Seminoles. The federal government sent regular army troops to join the southern militia in suppressing the revolt. Pointing to competing federal, state, and private interests, Ellisor shows how General Thomas Jesup's orders to force a speedy Creek removal [End Page 66] sometimes conflicted with the desires of the speculators, courts, and mobs of Georgia and Alabama. Jesup did successfully deport 14,609 Creeks by the end of 1836, and he...