Abstract

At the beginning of 1942, to most Australians the war against the Fascist powers had become a desperate struggle for their physical survival. The fall of Singapore, the bombing of Darwin, the Japanese advance in New Guinea, were traumatic experiences: the enemy presence at the doors of the country made everybody aware of the necessity of vigilance against any possible enemy or collaborator within. In March the members of the anti-British, quasi-Fascist and anti Semitic Australia First Movement were secretly interned.1 During the same period many Italians were rounded up, especially in Queensland, where the Commonwealth Government feared a Japanese landing. In these circumstances the Italians in Australia who had opposed Fascism since its inception became aware that, for several reasons, their old methods of fighting this doctrine were no longer effective. First, there was widespread distrust of all Italians, whatever political ideas they claimed to profess and irrespective of their period of residence in Australia. They were suspected of being if not actual, at least potential fifth columnists. Thus, scared of being even remotely involved in political activities, Italians tended to shun political discussions. Also, as so many of them were interned, the size of the audience for the anti-Fascists, who, before the war, had concentrated their propaganda efforts almost exclusively on the Italian community, was greatly restricted. This factor, and the lack of political rapport with the Australian public, promised to hamper any effort to revive the struggle against Fascism along the lines followed in the past. Many anti-Fascists recognised the necessity for a radically new approach to fighting Fascism; they believed that an anti-Fascist policy, in order to be effective, should take note of the changed political reality; also, that this new outlook should be institutionalised by the creation of a new political organisation. The isolation and, even more, the hostility which the anti-Fascists experienced during these months of 1942, magnified the blunders of their previous tactics and forced them to reassess their strategy and to plan it along altogether different lines. They realised, for instance, that they had committed a great mistake in neglecting to obtain the support, or at least the interest, of the Australian people for their cause. They had restricted their activities to the Italian community, thus failing to 'internationalise' the struggle against Fascism. In consequence of their shortsightedness, anti-Fascism before the war was understood by Australians to be a parochial squabble among migrants, and of no direct relevance to their society.2 To achieve success now, Italian anti-Fascists had to win the backing of the Australian people.

Full Text
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