Abstract
This chapter considers a further proposal that promises to rehabilitate the role of emotions in deliberative rationality, which he calls the ‘search hypothesis of emotion’. Rooted in a model of decision-making derived from artificial intelligence, the search hypothesis characterizes emotions as psychological devices that restrict agents' attention to a small subset of the possible consequences of any action. On this view emotions are essential catalysts in the production of rational action, as they prevent agents from having to consider the potentially infinite number of possible consequences that an action may lead to. The chapter argues that while the search hypothesis is not viable as a definition of emotions, it may prove to be a good account of what emotions typically do.
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