Abstract

Anxious to prevent the recurrence of a crisis similar to that of 1990-91, both the Gulf and the Western states perceived a need to establish an ongoing security arrangement in the Gulf. The impetus for trying to reach a comprehensive arrangement came from the Arab Gulf states, within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) — the winners in the Gulf War and the leaders of the anti-Iraqi coalition. The incentive to establish a comprehensive defense settlement in the post-1990-91 Gulf War era came from the Arab Gulf states, which considered themselves the victims of the Iraqi invasion and the potential targets of future Iraqi aggression. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the GCC states most vulnerable to an Iraqi invasion, opposed reliance on large permanent Egyptian and Syrian forces, a view apparently accepted by the other Gulf states. Iraq's failure to change its hostile image, in the perception of the GCC states, discounted any possibility of regional cooperation with it.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.