The Scope and Limits of State Authority

Abstract

This chapter addresses the issue of the appropriate limits on a legitimate authority’s use of coercive power. The discussion is guided by a commitment to the Harm Principle—a bedrock of political liberalism—and begins with the issue of how this principle should be interpreted. It then scrutinizes a number of objections to the compatibility between Joseph Raz’s liberal perfectionism and the principle, and argues that nearly all of these fail. One objection, however, does manage to show that Raz’s own interpretation of the principle fails to justify a sufficiently narrow understanding of harm, and thus to set plausible limits on State authority. The remainder of the chapter develops and defends an interpretation of the principle as prohibiting actions which threaten others’ possession of an equal share of liberty. The nature of the value of liberty is explored, and it is argued that this understanding of harm sets appropriate limits on State action while still enabling the State to pursue the goals of Equal Liberty within the bounds of its legitimate political authority.