The Scientific Judgment-Making Process from a Virtue Ethics Perspective

Abstract

From my own standpoint as a scientist, I, in this paper attempt to explore the scientific judgement-making process from an ethical perspective. In the process of developing truthful scientific knowledge, there are a myriad of judgements to make for the scientist. However, our contemporary world, dominated by technology, rules and regulations, presents us with less unconditioned opportunities for exercising our judgmental abilities. Any deliberation about a choice of action within our practice is, in a manner, made for us, and not by us. The challenges that we meet is largely assumed solved either by rules of conduct or by formulas where the right thing to do is based on mechanical computations (deontology), or as within utilitarianism where one focuses on the consequences of an action. My thesis is, however, that virtue ethics and the concept of Phronesis, as a framework, is better suited to grasp the peculiarity of the scientific practice compared to the contemporary mind-set. Hence, I will try to display my perspective and show how virtue ethics can lead to enhanced understanding of both the epistemological and the ethical parts of the scientific practice.