The Science of Consciousness and Emotion

Abstract

Abstract This chapter turns to sources of uncertainty in the science of consciousness and emotion. To have a science of consciousness at all, we need reliable ways of disentangling conscious and unconscious processing. In the case of vision, long-running debates about blindsight epitomize two major problems: the criterion problem and the problem of confounders. These problems arise even more strongly in the case of valenced experience, since methods for eliciting unconscious analogues of valenced experiences are less mature. In the absence of secure ways of dissociating valenced experience from its unconscious analogues, two rival pictures of the neural basis of valenced experience are likely to persist. On one picture, valenced experience wells up directly from subcortical mechanisms without the need for further cortical processing. On the other, subcortical circuits produce coordinated behavioural responses, but conscious experience only comes with cortical involvement. Unfortunately, current evidence does not allow us to choose confidently between these pictures.