The sceptic's dillema: An Indian version

Abstract

The question of the existence of sceptical trends in Indian philosophy has been a recurrent preoccupation of various scholars. This question has often been discussed from a comparative viewpoint. The existence of powerful sceptical trends in Greek philosophy, and their substantial contribution to the development of modern Western philosophy since the Renaissance, has led scholars of Indian and of comparative philosophy towards a careful examination of the sceptical traditions of Eastern philosophies. However, the existence of sceptical trends in Indian philosophy has sometimes been denied. It has been argued that Indian philosophical tradition lacks a thorough system of scepticism or that sceptical systems did not play any major role in the development of Indian philosophy.1 In the present paper I shall try to suspend any judgment on everything regarding the question of the existence of sceptical systems or traditions in India. I shall assume, instead, that one can find sceptical arguments, total as well as partial, in Indian philosophy. Confining the discussion to arguments rather than systems will obviously avoid falling into a possible trap set by the sceptic himself, who would of course be one of the first to deny the existence of any 'system' or 'tradition' whatsoever — his own as well as that of any other philosopher. Furthermore, the presentation of certain arguments as sceptical will not require me to decide whether or not the general position of the philosopher is actually sceptical. It is naturally not my intention to show that it is possible to find sceptical arguments in indian philosophy ; this fact is so evident that it needs no further proof. My intention is rather to examine one of the forms of the bitter controversy between the sceptic and all his philosophical rivals. When a sceptic fells a tree under which other philosophers have found shelter and comfort, he must take into account that the falling of the three may drive off its branches birds of prey — sophisticated arguments that the philosophers have stationed there to defend them. It is my conviction that it would be wrong to regard the struggle between the