The Sceptical Response to the Existential Problem of Systemic Suffering

Francis Jonbäck

doi:10.1515/opth-2020-0151

Abstract

Abstract Recently, Yujin Nagasawa has argued that “systemic suffering” – suffering inherent in the evolutionary process – poses a problem for existentially optimistic theists and atheists who think that the world is overall good and therefore are happy and thankful to be alive in it. In short, he shows that it is difficult to consistently believe that the world is overall good when also recognising the existence of systemic suffering. In this article, I evaluate a sceptical response to the problem. The idea behind the response is a sort of scepticism according to which we do not know whether our knowledge about the realm of values is representative. I argue that the response fails, but that theism in conjunction with such scepticism succeeds. Atheism in conjunction with such scepticism, on the other hand, does not. I also argue that atheists can at least consistently hope that the world is overall good, despite systemic suffering. Finally, I answer objections and conclude.

Highlights

Suffering inherent in the evolutionary process is frequently invoked when arguing against the existence of a perfectly good and all-powerful God.[1]
Nagasawa has presented a new problem of suffering, which shows that there might be a contradiction between the following propositions: (1) The world is overall good
There seems to be a contradiction between the value judgement expressed by existential optimism and the existence of suffering inherent in the process of evolution

Summary

Introduction

Suffering inherent in the evolutionary process is frequently invoked when arguing against the existence of a perfectly good and all-powerful God.[1] Recently, Yujin Nagasawa has argued that such suffering poses a problem for theists and atheists who are existential optimists and as such think that the world is overall good and are thankful to be alive in it. Sceptical theists can be existential optimists despite the evil inherent in the evolutionary system while sceptical atheists cannot. To hold the title of “God,” one must, as a minimum, be all-powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good and the creator of the world.[3] A theist believes that there is a being holding the title of “God,” whereas an atheist denies it. I use Nagasawa’s term “systemic suffering” to describe seemingly gratuitous suffering inherent in the evolutionary system or process.[4]

The existential problem of systemic suffering

The sceptical response

Adding a world view

Objections

Conclusion