The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and corporate acquisitions

Abstract

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to analyze and compare the performance of corporate acquisitions between the pre- and post-SOX periods, using both short-term and long-term analyses.Design/methodology/approachThe sample includes 9,463 mergers and tender offers undertaken by publicly traded US firms between 1996 and 2009. The authors used the standard event study methodology for short-term performance analysis; Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) method to identify merger motives; and standard benchmark adjusted return on assets (sales) (Barber and Lyon, 1996) and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000) to analyze long-term performance.FindingsCompared to the pre-SOX period, US acquirers experience significantly higher announcement returns in the post-SOX period; the results are robust to various controls like bidder, target and deal characteristics, bidder management quality, and product market competition. Similar results (in favor of post-SOX US acquirers) are obtained with long-term post-acquisition operating and stock performance analyses.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper only addressed domestic acquisitions.Originality/valueThis paper adds to the growing body of research on the impact of SOX on publicly traded US corporations. By examining corporate acquisitions, an important long-term investment decision for a firm, the paper shows that despite the complex nature of SOX, substantial compliance costs and the unintended negative consequence it engendered, the act had a beneficial impact in an important area of corporate finance.