The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-dimensional Revenue Maximization

Abstract

We consider the sample complexity of revenue maximization for multiple bidders in unrestricted multi-dimensional settings. Specifically, we study the standard model of additive bidders whose values for heterogeneous items are drawn independently. For any such instance and any , we show that it is possible to learn an -Bayesian Incentive Compatible auction whose expected revenue is within of the optimal -BIC auction from only polynomially many samples. Our fully nonparametric approach is based on ideas that hold quite generally and completely sidestep the difficulty of characterizing optimal (or near-optimal) auctions for these settings. Therefore, our results easily extend to general multi-dimensional settings, including valuations that are not necessarily even subadditive , and arbitrary allocation constraints. For the cases of a single bidder and many goods, or a single parameter (good) and many bidders, our analysis yields exact incentive compatibility (and for the latter also computational efficiency). Although the single-parameter case is already well understood, our corollary for this case extends slightly the state of the art.