Abstract
ABSTRACTIn this essay I review an underappreciated strand of thought according to which the best Kantian moral theory has less in common with paradigmatically deontological theories and more in common with virtue theories than is standardly maintained. I then argue this program should be continued further, to provide not only a virtue‐based account of moral judgment but also a virtue‐based account of moral worth. I make a case that this fusion of Kantian theory with virtue theory provides the best account of moral rules, and I close by suggesting that it generates a promising new understanding of moral rights.
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