The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective, 1904-05 by David s> Wells Sandra Wilson (review)

Abstract

758 SEER, 79, 4, 200I the cases of ArtfurGorgey being a traitor,the Holy Crown being a gift of the Pope, and so on; and especially in light of the debates occasioned by Gyula Szekffi'sI9I4 book on the exiled PrinceRakoczi, by FerencEckhart'scriticism of the old view of Hungarian legal history in the 193os, and by the I96os debate on nation, nationalismandpatriotisminitiatedby ErikMolnar. Pter's volume bringstogetheressayson a broad range of importanttopics, investigatedwith a mix of detachment and empathy that so often distinguishes historiographical achievement of great significance. In spite of the present reviewer'sdisagreementwith the author's'symbolicmap' of Central/Eastern Europe in view of the constitutional history unfolding from his account, this book is surelyno exception. It is to be wished thatsome of the most important studiesin it, which have only been publishedin Hungarian or in publications of limited availability,are made accessiblefor an English-readingpublic. Central European University LAsZL6 KONTLER Budapest Wells, David, and Wilson, Sandra (eds). TheRusso-Japanese Warin Cultural Perspective, 1904-05. Macmillan, Basingstoke,and StMartin'sPress,New York, I 999. Xii + 213 pp. Notes. Bibliography.Index. C42.50. ONE war can hide another. The Russo-JapaneseWarhas been overshadowed by the Great War that came a decade later. Nevertheless, the earlier, more limited struggle had very complex ramifications, not least, as this volume remindsus, in providingmaterialfor (usuallywrong) conclusionsto be drawn about the nature of warfare at that time. The main focus of this excellent collection of articles,however, is not on the militaryhistoryof the war but on how it was perceived. It is especially to be welcomed because specialists in aspectsof bothJapanese and Russian cultureare included. Three of the eight contributionslook at theJapanese context, three at Russiawhile the othertwo take in both sides. Most of the items are about the literatureof war while two contributorsexamine the impact of the war on military analysts and on the Russian intelligentsia. In their introduction SandraWilson and David Wellstakea look at RussoJapanese contacts prior to the war. In particularthe authors show how each country built up its linguistic and culturalknowledge of the other. In Russia, conventional fears of 'the Yellow Peril' were interspersed by intermittent vogues for Japanese culture. In Japan, Turgenev, Goncharov, Dostoevskii and Tolstoi became well-knownand influential.They also sketchthe growing conflict over Manchuria in the i 8gos and provide a usefulaccount of the war itself and of the peace, not overlooking the fact, mentioned again in more detail in Sandra Wilson's later contribution, that, contraryto popular belief, the immense cost of the war and the terriblecasualtiesmade it impossiblefor Japan to contemplate prolonging the struggleeven though, in militaryterms, it was the more successful. One of the most interesting contributions, by S. P. Mackenzie, traces the 'lessons' learned from the war by military analysts.The obvious lesson, that heavy weaponry was the key and well-constructed defences were virtually REVIEWS 759 impregnable, was almost universally ignored. Instead, most observers Japanese, Russian and fromthe widerworld attributedJapanese victoryto superior 'spirit'.It confirmed theoristsin their pet ideas of the superiorityof active, offensive warfare. The war at sea was equally misunderstood. The importance of mines, despite the loss of several ships, and the way that blockade duty tied up resourceswere not widely appreciated. As Mackenzie tells it, it was not understood that the major land battles were not decisive; that economic and logistical pressureswere crucial or, in Japan's case, that the surprise,PearlHarbour-style,opening assaultwas not a complete success. Overall, the war confirmed existing assumptions about the priority of large navies, offensive armies and the crucial role of morale. While Mackenzie is, by and large, correct, he does not do justice to those who drew the right conclusions. To name only the most famous on the Russian side, Durnovo assumed in his February I914 memorandum to the Tsar that war with Germany would test every aspect of Russian society, industryand infrastructure and would not be won or lost through 'spirit'. The othermajorpiece of socialanalysis,byAdrianJones, isa characteristically sweeping, pugnacious and, at the end of the day, unconvincing argument that the war created a seismic shiftin the outlook of the Russian intelligentsia by showing that the Japanese way to progress was the new wave not the Russian one...