Abstract

At the time, the Western press described the Soviet decision not to take part in the Los Angeles Olympic Games as revenge for the boycott of Moscow-1980. Even today, the ‘revenge thesis’ is still the default explanation for those who would cite the events of 1984. Since the collapse of the USSR, Soviet-era archives have opened, giving an inside look at their decision-making. An examination of the reports reveals that the Politburo voted to expend vast resources to preparing Soviet athletes for the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles. The best revenge among their politicians, athletes, coaches, officials and journalists was to smash the Americans on American soil. Along the way the Soviets signed contracts and negotiated conditions as if they intended to take part. Then two things changed: party leader Yuri Andropov, a proponent of participation, was replaced in February 1984 by the aging and ill Konstantin Chernemko, an Olympic sceptic; and Soviet pilots on September 1, 1983, shot down a Korean airliner that had strayed into Soviet airspace, killing 269 innocents. These events energised conservative opinion in the USA. Elements on the far right called for the Soviets to be banned from the Games. The leading group, the Ban the Soviet Coalition, later threatened Soviet athletes and announced they would try to get them to defect. This was a small group deemed unimportant by the Los Angeles Olympic Organising Committee and the White House. Yet, the Soviets somehow contrived to actually believe this small collection of right-wing politicians and businesspeople were a real threat. Ultimately, it was fear of this less than fearsome group and State Department resistance that led the Politburo to keep their athletes home.

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