Abstract

AbstractRussia is one of the loudest, most prolific users of offensive cyber operations (OCOs). Rather than viewing cyber as a domain, it instead looks at the full spectrum of information operations; from influencing foreign governments to conducting tactical attacks against networks in wartime. The battle for information supremacy is enshrined into Russian doctrine since the Soviet era. Russia is well-poised to succeed in intangible warfare through its thorough integration of electronic warfare into its warfighting forces alongside an acute awareness of the utility of cyber operations for strategic gains. However, volume does not translate into quality. Russian operations as carried out by the GRU, SVR and others are often characterized by extreme technical competence marred by a recurring lack of operational discipline. As a result, intricate malware is employed poorly, deception operations are unconvincing, and ultimately Russia is frequently unable to achieve objectives through the employment of OCOs. This chapter reviews unique advantages and disadvantages of the Russian approach to OCOs, through the lens of observed operations such as the Sandworm campaigns, military culture and doctrine, and available expertise.

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