Abstract

Jury nullification occurs when a jury renders a verdict based on what it feels the law ought to demand, as opposed to what the law in fact demands. While it is beyond doubt that criminal juries in common law jurisdictions have the ability to so act without fear of legal censure or redress, it remains a highly contentious issue as to whether such juries ought to be informed of this ability. One of the main objections to informing jurors of their purview to nullify is that, in so acting, the rule of law is subverted. Thus, while jurors might have the ability to so act, they ought to be discouraged from doing so. This ability, in other words, must be hidden from them – a subterfuge justified by reference to the rule of law. In this paper I closely examine the rule of law objection and conclude that the conflicts between jury nullification and the rule of law are greatly exaggerated. In fact, in many respects jury nullification promotes the very same ends and goals as does the rule of law. Hence, I conclude, if there is a reason to withhold from the jury any knowledge of jury nullification, such a reason cannot be grounded on considerations of the rule of law.

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