The Royal Navy and the Irish Civil War

Abstract

Historical study of the Irish Civil War of 1922–3 has hitherto concentrated overwhelmingly on internal matters — the actual internecine struggle on the ground for ideological and political control. While the value of this approach is obvious, it has inevitably failed to focus on the continuing role of the British armed services; furthermore, an exclusive concern with land-army affairs, whether Irish or British, must result in a distorted picture. It is thus particularly unfortunate that the activities of the Royal Navy during the revolutionary period have been largely neglected. Here it is hoped to demonstrate that the Royal Navy, beyond its expected role of gun-running prevention, did have an influence on the early course of the Civil War, an influence that was, in part, determined by the wider protection of imperial interests once British troops had withdrawn from the localities in May 1922. The fragmentation of southern Irish politics and society, in the wake of the treaty settlement of December 1921, came as a genuine surprise to the Admiralty. At the time, it had taken the promise of peace at face value, making it known that, pending negotiations on certain properties and signal stations, it had little future interest in Ireland provided the three southern ‘treaty ports’ (Cóbh/Queenstown, Berehaven and Lough Swilly) were safeguarded and visiting rights upheld. In such circumstances, there was seen to be no need for the standard Irish Patrol of three destroyers, naval forces being ‘ultimately’ reduced to just two fishery protection vessels. Nor, as future area command was to pass to C.-in-C. Plymouth, was there technical need or political advisability in the retention of the two flag officer commands at Buncrana (C.-in-C. Western Approaches) and Kingstown (Dún Laoghaire).